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Abstract 
Is Retransmission Consent still needed in 2016:  
A look at Regulation, Consumers, Technology and Profit 
Chelsea O’Rourke 
 
 
 
 
Let’s say you are ready to relax and to watch your favorite network television 
show on your cable box.  You sit down, pick up the remote and tune to the appropriate 
number channel to find CBS.  No thought needed.  Well that channel is being provided to 
you as a result of the cable company’s negotiation with CBS known as “Retransmission 
Consent”.  Such negotiations became a requirement of federal regulation implemented in 
1992 and have been controversial in the cable and satellite industries ever since.  Now, 
these negotiations sometimes fail resulting in a broadcasting impasse with the consumers 
sitting down at their televisions and seeing a blackout of certain channels.  Is this impasse 
a profit grab or truly an unnecessary battle caused by regulation and the changing impact 
of ever-changing technology?   
  With technology changing how the television industry traditionally did business, 
many changes have taken place over the last twenty-five years.  Consumers, technology 
and profit, are at the heart of the process and the ongoing debate. 
This research paper evaluates whether the current form of regulation is still 
needed today; whether modifications should be made or even whether the regulation 
should be repealed.   
vii  
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
Television professionals can cite chapter and verse about the intricacies of the 
retransmission consent requirements.  However, many consumers have no idea of the 
history and the impact of the rule on what they watch on television.  Retransmission 
consent officially entered the legislative lexicon in 1992 as an element of the United 
States Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act.  The Act amended 
the Communications Act of 1934 “to provide increased consumer protection and to 
promote increased competition in the cable television and related markets” (Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, p. 3).  It mandated that 
broadcast television stations, which by law provide their signals at no charge over the air 
to consumers, have the freedom to decide under what terms and at what price cable 
providers carry those signals.  
The rules implementing the Act allow broadcasters to choose between a must-
carry contract and a retransmission consent contract.  The Federal Communications 
Commission’s (FCC) must-carry rules require cable television operators to carry local 
television stations on their systems to meet the needs and interests of the local 
communities they serve.  Must-carry contracts require all cable companies to carry the 
local stations, as part of its basic consumer package, with the broadcast channel number 
used over the public airways.  In Bohanan, Christi, Richardson, and Yadon (2007) the 
authors describe how the FCC’s principle of fairness, carefully crafted in both the 1927 
Radio Act and 1952 Television Act influenced must-carry rules in white paper prepared 
for the National Telecommunications Cooperative Association FCC stresses fairness, 
dividing up radio licenses and TV stations across the nation. 
2 
This allocation policy was the first of the components that support the 
“localism” concept in American television broadcasting.  Stations are 
licensed to particular communities and also have been required - first to a 
greater and now to a lesser extent – to demonstrate, at time of initial 
licensing and periodically when seeking license renewal, that the station 
has assessed local needs and interests and will provide, or has provided, 
programming to meet those needs and interests. (Bohanan et al., 2007)  
Contrary to must-carry contracts, retransmission consent contracts require the 
broadcaster and the cable company to negotiate terms under which the cable operator 
carries the broadcaster’s signal. This means that cable operators and other multichannel 
video program distributors (MVPDs) must obtain permission from broadcasters before 
carrying a station’s programming.  For example, a local CBS station may propose that 
Viacom, the world’s sixth largest cable company, pay cash to carry the station’s 
programming.  Additionally, a MVPD could negotiate exchanging advertising or new 
channel space, in lieu of payment for its content.  FX and ESPN2 both originated through 
retransmission consent agreements.  If a cable operator does not accept a broadcaster’s 
proposal, the cable operator is not permitted to retransmit the station’s signal, causing a 
broadcasting impasse, or blackouts, in some markets.  
Retransmission consent was designed by the FCC to provide relief from the must-
carry rules that require cable operators to carry local stations (Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992).  Retransmission consent allows all stations to 
keep their must-carry agreements or enter into negotiations with cable operators.  Small, 
independent broadcast stations as well as government owned stations typically elected to 
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keep their must-carry status rather than enter into negotiations.  The FCC requires 
broadcast stations and cable operators to renew or revise their retransmission consent 
agreements every three years.  
The advent of retransmission consent rules substantially increased broadcaster 
revenues.  Consequently, local stations now depend on retransmission streams as 
additional income.  The pressure of continuing to maintain and increase this revenue 
stream is significant, and the triennial negotiations often evolve into power struggles.  
Stalemates between broadcasters and cable operators can and do occur and have become 
a more common occurrence in recent years (Zubair, 2014).  
For example, in May 2000, Time-Warner Cable vehemently opposed ABC’s FCC 
petition that asked for a declaratory ruling and enforcement order against the cable 
operator.  Time Warner Cable, boasting 13 million cable subscribers, denounced ABC for 
repeatedly refusing the cable operator’s requests for a retransmission consent agreement. 
A renewed agreement would have ensured Time Warner’s right to carry ABC stations for 
the rest of the year, thereby guaranteeing their customers the ability to view those stations 
and giving the parties a realistic opportunity to work out a long- term agreement1.   
The power struggle described above is not uncommon, and it can result with MVPD 
consumers in a blackout when it does occur (FCC, 2000a).  A broadcasting blackout 
occurs when “a local broadcaster pulls its signal from a pay-TV provider’s system, 
because the two sides disagree” (McKinnon, 2016).  The consumer still has the ability to 
                                                 
1 After 39 hours of disruption of ABC’s signal, Time Warner came to an agreement to reinstate the 
programming.  At the same time the FCC was about to declare that Time Warner was in violation of the 
FCC rules mandating that they must continue to broadcast the programming during the sweeps period 
(FCC, 2000a). 
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watch the broadcast channel over the air, but not on a home receiver obtained from the 
MVPD.  Such circumstances often cast cable operators in a negative light.  However, we 
must take a step back and consider whether or not the Act and its regulatory scheme are 
to blame for the perceived unfairness.  Now, in what is claimed to be an issue of fairness, 
cable and satellite providers are pressing the FCC to revise the retransmission consent 
regulations.  The debate is ongoing and the outcome of the proposed changes in the 
regulatory process is anything but clear at this point.  There are three primary factors or 
variables that will influence the debate: the interests of consumers, the continuing 
development and impact of technology, and the importance of profits to the industry.  
Consumer consumption of traditional television over the air is changing as fast as 
the relevant technology. More and more consumers are becoming what the industry calls 
“cord cutters,” willing to watch a la carte programming over the air or online rather than 
pay for expensive bundled cable or satellite services. Why should cable customers have 
to pay for over the air content? Should broadcasters share in the cable company profits 
from their broadcast signals? Is retransmission consent viable or even needed?  And how 
would rule changes affect the industry? The broadcasters revenue model now depends on 
retransmission payments to generate funds to underwrite quality programming. Broadcast 
network content continues to be the most watched programming on cable. If 
retransmission payments vanish, how will broadcast networks fund local programming?  
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
Only industry insiders could have envisioned how technological advances, 
regulatory guidelines, and legal decisions have reshaped the television industry to this 
point.  Since the advent of a la carte viewing and live-streaming platforms, the broadcast 
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industry’s monopoly on viewing has been flipped upside down.  Internet companies like 
Amazon and Netflix now create original content available on multiple platforms, 
enabling viewers to watch their favorite shows on a laptop computer, a tablet, or mobile 
phone. Broadcasting Networks, which once paid affiliates to air content, now demand 
payment for the network programs that they and their subsidiaries produce.  Contract 
disputes between broadcasters and MVPDs now cause lengthy and public blackouts. 
While networks blame programming costs for driving up cable prices, the impact of 
retransmission consent fees, passed on from broadcasters to cable operators and then to 
the consumers need to be understood as well.  
The retransmission consent provision of the 1992 Cable TV and Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act requires cable content operators to obtain permission 
from broadcasters before carrying their programming (Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, p. 4).  
Today’s MVPDs which administer cable, satellite, and fiber television, face angry 
consumers and a change in revenue structure which problems they blame on the 
retransmission consent provision.  These companies are seeing television subscription 
revenues drop and consumer dissatisfaction rise. The multi-system operators blame their 
woes on the retransmission consent rules.   
This study will analyze the phenomena of retransmission consent over time, 
examining its genesis and evolution.  The researcher has created a timeline of major 
events regulating retransmission consent and considers each event in detail.  
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1.2. Research Questions 
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate if retransmission consent is still necessary 
in 2016.  This study seeks to answer the following related questions:  
1. Why was retransmission consent needed when first implemented in 1992?  
2. What are the variables associated with retransmission consent negotiations?   
3. What effects have consumers, technology and profit had on the field of television 
and the entertainment industry?  
4. Are the cost and blackouts hurting the industry and what justification is there to 
maintain or modify the current retransmission consent rules? 
1.3. Definitions 
• Broadcasting Impasse or Blackout – When a broadcast station is no longer 
distributed on a MVPD due to a breakdown in contract negotiations. 
• DMA (Designated Market Area) – A location for television and radio viewing 
to be defined as the area’s local market.  
• MSO (Multiple-Systems Operator) – A company that owns and operates more 
then two cable or satellite systems.  For the purpose of the paper and to avoid 
confusion, this term will be substituted with MVPD.  MVPD, at the time of this 
paper, is a modern version of MSO and such are more commonplace.  
• Must-carry – A law that has roots starting in 1966 and passed in 1992, which 
requires cable and satellite companies to provide broadcasts from local stations to 
the local community.  The same channel number must be used and no fee is paid 
to either party.  
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• MVPD (Multichannel Video Programming Distributor) – A service provider 
whom charges a fee for their offering.  This includes cable companies, satellite 
companies and phone companies.   
• PEG (Public, educational or government access television) – Stations that 
typically included in the local must-carry discussion. 
• Retransmission Consent – Local broadcast television stations must agree before 
their service is provided to cable or satellite customers.  Negotiations for this 
contract are up for renewal every three years. 
1.4. Limitations 
 Due to the history of retransmission consent negotiations being private in nature, 
the amount of public information available related to specific retransmission negotiations 
and related disputes is limited.  The research reviewed for this paper was restricted to 
public information and data collected from independent sources, such as SNL Kagan, 
cited in the bibliography. 
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2. Literature Review  
 The evolution of retransmission consent through the years has suggested that the 
literature review be organized around historic events.  To accomplish a sense of order, a 
timeline of historic events brought together from the literature review has been created. 
Critical events of retransmission consent in the broadcast industry were weighed for 
importance.  Out of necessity, less important events regarding both the broadcaster and 
MVPDs were not included in this timeline.   
2.1. Years 1930-1991 
Since the 1930’s broadcast television has provided daily news and entertainment 
for American households.  General Electric (GE), Bell Laboratories, Stromberg Carlson 
and the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) used radio patents and radio advertising 
revenues to launch the television industry. RCA, owner of two NBC New York stations, 
transmitted the New York World’s Fair opening on April 30, 1939 (Abramson, 1987).  
CBS started broadcasting from the fifth floor of Grand Central Station a few months 
later.  WRGB, the CBS affiliate in Albany, New York, was an experimental station in 
General Electric’s Schenectady, New York, headquarters, offering four weekly 
broadcasts in 1928 (Abramson, 1987).  
By the end of 1939, the New York viewing market boasted two thousand 
television sets.  Using coaxial cable and a transmitter affixed to the top of the Empire 
State Building, Madison Square Garden broadcast cultural and sporting events to into the 
homes of New Yorkers (Abramson, 1987).  On July 1, 1941, the first television 
advertisement, for Bulova watches, appeared before the Brooklyn Dodgers and 
Philadelphia Phillies baseball game (Dalzell, 1995).  
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Television and radio production ceased during World War II when technologies 
that fueled both industries stimulated wartime applications for radar, aerial cameras, 
transmitters, and receivers.  After the war ended, approximately five thousand television 
sets were in use in the United States (Abramson, 1987).  By 1953 there were 347 
television stations on air and over 28.5 million TV sets were sold to dealers in the United 
States with concentrations in the East Coast states of over 84 percent.  While West Coast 
and Midwestern states trailed in 60 to 70 percent ranges, there were still many who were 
not part of this TV revolution.  While some could not receive the signal be due to location 
or income, many held conservative views on mass-market commercialism (Edgerton, 
2010).  For the next thirty years three broadcast networks, NBC, CBS, and ABC 
dominated the market fueled by ever-increasing advertising revenues.  American 
companies, selling cigarettes, athletic shoes, and over the counter digestive aids, sought 
to increase market share through television advertising. 
2.1.1. Regulation is introduced. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), created by Congress in 1934, 
regulates radio stations, broadcast television stations, cable providers, satellite providers, 
and, since 2005, Internet providers.  Since its inception, the FCC has required that local 
TV stations offer programming to meet the needs of their local communities, including 
news and entertainment.  
Although the FCC had granted over one hundred television licenses by late 1948, 
cities such as Denver, Colorado, and Austin, Texas lacked service. Swamped with more 
than seven hundred new television license applications and struggling with technical 
questions, the FCC decided to “freeze” the process of granting new licenses. The freeze, 
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expected to last only six months, was finally lifted in 1952 (Parsons, 2008).  One 
decision, stemming from the freeze, authorized the entire 70-channel ultra high frequency 
(UHF) band for use, a decision that facilitated cable channel development many years 
later (Ismail, 2011).   
By the early 1950’s, once a local station affiliated with a network, the station was 
able to add several hours of network programming to its daily schedules via its network 
affiliation.  Some smaller market stations were affiliated with two networks, cherry 
picking programming for inclusion on their air.  Networks paid affiliates for every 
sponsored network program that aired.  Moreover, local stations generated revenue by 
selling advertisements for their locally produced programs.  This “dual income” business 
model was profitable and remained unchanged for many years.  With only a handful of 
local stations available to households in each media market, there was little competition 
among stations for advertising revenue. 
2.1.2. Cable television enters the market. 
Cable television, initially called Community Antenna Television, became 
available to rural communities in Oregon, Arkansas, and Pennsylvania between 1948 and 
1950. Unlike traditional “terrestrial” television, where a signal is transmitted over the air 
by radio waves and received by a TV antenna attached to a set, cable television uses radio 
frequency (RF) signals transmitted through coaxial cables or light pulses through fiber 
optic cables that were invented later.  In areas where over-the-air broadcast reception was 
limited by distance from transmitters or mountains, large community antennas were 
constructed and cable run to individual homes.  Local companies providing cable 
installation and maintenance charged households around five dollars a month to receive 
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local and network programming (Parsons, 2008).  The addition of cable in these markets 
also helped to boost the sale of television sets.  
As the cable industry made greater inroads around the country, resentment 
between the broadcast and the cable industry was growing.  The FCC, which was 
established to regulate public communications, proved reluctant to intervene, claiming 
that it lacked jurisdiction over cable transmission and in turn the companies providing 
those transmissions. Still, many broadcast station operators complained that cable 
companies imported their signals, for free, and then sold their programming to viewers 
for a profit.   
Then, in 1963, the FCC issued a ruling in (Carter Mountain Transmission 
Corporation v. FCC, 1963), that denied a cable operator in Riverton, Wyoming, 
permission to import distant broadcast signals from Denver, Colorado.  As part of its 
decision, the FCC pointed out that Denver stations, located 352 miles southeast of Riverton, 
could not meet the needs and interests of the mid-central Wyoming community. At the same 
time, KWRB, a Riverton television station signed-on in 1957, told the FCC that loss of local 
advertising revenues would signal an end for the fledging station. 
By 1966 more than one million homes, out of sixty million, received cable and 
more than 1,200 cable systems were operating (Ismail, 2011).  An expanded 1966 FCC 
decision (FCC, 1966), imposed new conditions on cable operators in the one-hundred 
largest markets. First, a cable system was required to carry the signals of all local 
stations, known as the must-carry provision. Second, the cable system was not permitted 
to carry the programs of a distant station when they duplicated the programs of a local 
station. Additionally, the FCC required cable operators to obtain formal permission 
before importing distant signals. This permission was seldom granted.  
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The FCC’s actions in 1966 were designed to prevent “unfair” competition by 
cable systems and to foreclose any “adverse impact” on broadcasting as a result of 
cable’s growth.  The purpose of extending these rules to the top one hundred markets was 
to protect UHF broadcasters, which were still struggling to gain a foothold despite the 
FCC’s efforts since the 1950s to promote broadcasting in the UHF band (Ismail, 2011). 
2.1.3. Cable viewed in a new light.  
Scrutiny, skepticism and criticism about the expanding cable television industry 
began to develop more intensely in the early 1970’s when academics and policy makers 
began to see cable as an opportunity for profit. Cable, with its abundant channel capacity, 
was suddenly being heralded as the “savior of the communications industry, an antidote 
to television’s ‘vast wasteland’ of programming controlled by greedy capitalists,” 
(Eisenmann, 2000).  In recognition of cable’s expansion, policy-makers argued that cable 
could provide citizens an opportunity to produce their own programming and distribute it 
free on municipal cable channels.   
The 1972 Cable Television Report and Order regulations were the result of a 
compromise between the broadcasters and cable operators, and these regulations were 
defended by the FCC as serving the public interest (Ismail, 2011).  “Under the 1972 rules, 
new systems were required to have at least twenty channels and two-way capacity, and 
systems in the top 100 markets had to.” Set aside channel space for public, educational 
and government (PEG) use.  By way of example, the FCC, under pressure from the 
Brookings Institute and RAND Corporation, to provide supportive regulation for the 
cable industry, reversed its earlier decision and allowed cable operators to import distant 
signals (Parsons, 2008). 
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The 1972 Cable Television Report and Order continued the must-carry provision 
first described in 1966.  The FCC now permitted cable operators to import a number of 
distant signals, depending on a station’ s market size (top 50, 50-100, smaller markets). 
Imported signals were not allowed to copy identical programming already being provided 
by local stations.  Additionally, cable systems with three thousand five hundred or more 
subscribers were required to originate a portion of their own programming.  Finally, as 
part of the FCC’s 1972 directive, municipalities could ask for three percent of the cable 
operator’s gross revenue (Ismail, 2011).  The future for the still-emerging cable industry 
appeared bright.  
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the cable television industry became subject to 
copyright liability for retransmission of distant broadcast signals.  This change to the 
Copyright Act was the first major change to the copyright rulebook since the early 1900’s 
and signaled a significant recognition of the power and expansion of cable television.  
These rules listed conditions that allowed cable systems to obtain a compulsory license to 
retransmit copyrighted works, without having to negotiate with each copyright holder 
individually.  This allowed a cable operator to acquire and pay for one license to cover all 
the television programming from that source.  Further if a cable operator imported a 
signal that violated an exclusivity agreement by a local broadcaster, the broadcaster was 
given the right to sue the cable operator (Parsons, 2008). 
2.1.4. Deregulation of cable. 
Congress, enacting the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, sought to 
establish a national regulatory framework for the cable industry and promote its growth. 
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The Cable Act attempted to strike a balance between cable operators and the 
municipalities they served (Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984).  
The FCC’s shift from non-regulation (Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 1958) 
to extensive regulation (In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's 
Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, 1970), 
including must-carry provisions and technical standards, created industry instability and 
fueled the need for a comprehensive television statute. Consequently, both cable 
operators and municipalities turned to Congress to create regulatory certainty.   
Stability would permit both cable operators and municipalities to make long-term 
decisions.  Cable operators argued their industry faced stiff competition from broadcast 
television and videocassette recorders and endured significant capital expenditures before 
signing up new subscribers.  Cities wanted the ability to negotiate the entire franchise 
agreement, especially rates for basic service. Basic service was defined as the lowest cost 
tier for “retransmission of broadcast signals,” including a provision of public, 
educational, and government programming. 
The most significant change resulting from the Cable Act was the elimination of 
rate regulations for cable subscriptions.  Section 623 of the Cable Act, together with FCC 
regulations implementing Section 623, abolished rate regulation except where cable 
systems were not subject to "effective competition."  Congress ruled “a cable system will 
be considered to face effective competition whenever the franchise market receives three 
or more broadcast signals (Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984).”  At the time, 
very few municipalities did not demonstrate "effective competition" as defined in the Act.  
This was confirmed by Myers and Schuering (1991) for the area of Illinois . 
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While the 1984 Cable Act did little to change the earlier mandated must-carry 
provision, Congress, in addition to deregulating the industry, clearly spelled out 
requirements for ownership, franchise provisions, privacy, pole attachments, and equal 
employment opportunity.  
2.1.5. Summary 1930-1991.  
Over several decades, the television industry and programming content has 
permeated the American household becoming an integral part of the consumer’s 
entertainment and information life.  The MVPD industry was born out of a technological 
deficit that prevented television content from reaching the consumer on a broad-based 
basis, and cable television providers became the first to aggressively fill that void.  
Consumers who could not receive over-the-air television transmissions, but wanted to 
consume television programming, turned to cable providers to serve their hunger for 
television product.   
Through the year 1991, cable providers became significant players in how content 
was delivered to households, resulting in an increased revenue stream, directly from the 
consumer, for the cable industry.  On the other hand, broadcast affiliates were 
compensated by their parent networks for carrying and distributing programming content 
to the local viewing market.  This created the local channel’s first revenue stream.  In 
addition to a healthy and growing advertising revenue, the affiliate now had a second 
revenue stream to fund their station.   
As the relationship between the television industry, including the networks and 
their affiliates and the cable industry matured, cracks or complications in that relationship 
began to develop.  These complications were further exasperated by regulation intended 
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address issues developing between broadcasters and MVPDs at the same time that the 
U.S. was recovering from a recession.  In what regulators claimed to be an attempt to 
encourage economic growth at this time, the FCC worked to de-regulate the cable 
industry, broadcasters began to lose control of the monopoly they had on television.  
2.2. Years 1992-2004 
2.2.1. The 1992 cable act, a game changer. 
By 1992 cable television had become a growing national phenomenon with more 
than sixty percent of American households subscribing to a cable service (Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).  After the 1984 Cable 
Act deregulating the cable industry, the cost of basic monthly cable services soared, 
increasing forty percent for more for twenty-eight percent of U.S. cable subscribers over 
a six-year period.  The average subscriber’s monthly cable bill had now increased three 
times the Consumer Price Index since deregulation (Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992).  Competition between MVPD’s where 
consumers could choose between a variety of content distribution sources, an important 
goal of the 1984 Cable Act, was effectively nonexistent.  This was due in part to the high 
cost of creating a cable system or distribution platform that could compete with an 
existing operation.  In all but a small percentage of communities, the local franchised 
cable operator was the sole distributer of subscription television, allowing that operator 
an effective monopoly in the market.  
Since the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the federal government 
through the FCC has continued to maintain a stated interest in providing fair, efficient, 
and equitable distribution of content to its citizens via the public airwaves.  Thus, it was 
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no surprise when Congress, attempted to resolve an increasing number of complaints 
regarding the expanding and what some perceived to be a monopolistic cable industry in 
1992.  
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
addressed the rapid growth and exorbitant profits earned by cable operators since the 
industry deregulation in 1984.  Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act established must-carry 
requirements for cable systems authorized a framework for retransmission consent 
agreements, mandated carriage of PEG stations, instituted subscription rate regulation by 
state or local government, imposed restrictions on cable programming supplied by 
affiliated system operators, and even addressed indecency (Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992).  
Congressional hearings held prior to the passage of the 1992 Cable Act revealed 
that cable’s horizontal integration (cable operators owned by the same entity) and vertical 
integration (one entity operates the cable system and provides content) prevented 
broadcasters from effectively competing in the new media marketplace (Lutzker, 1994).  
The cable industry’s strong position in the marketplace now jeopardized free local 
broadcast television.  Consequently, Congress turned to mandatory carriage, or must-
carry provisions to preserve local broadcasting, ensure a wide variety of programming, 
and remedy the cable industry’s perceived unbalanced business practices.  As part of the 
conditions set by Congress, cable operators were required to obtain broadcasters’ 
permission before carrying their content.  The broadcasters were now given a choice to 
either negotiate a deal for the carriage consent, or require the cable provider to must-
carry.   
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The technological effect of guaranteed signal carriage on cable stations was 
significant.  By 1993 local television stations were required to elect the right to must-
carry or the right to negotiate retransmission consent.  A cable operation might only have 
enough signal space to carry a predetermined number of stations.  If all of the broadcast 
channels elected the must-carry option, those stations would take up nearly one third of 
the available spectrum.  Consequently, most stations began to choose the retransmission 
consent agreement option.  
If a broadcast station asserted its must-carry rights, the broadcaster could not 
demand compensation from the cable operator.  While must-carry and retransmission 
consent are distinct and function separately, they are related in that commercial 
broadcasters are required every three years to choose and must keep that choice for the 
whole time period. 
Although the 1992 Cable Act easily passed the House of Representatives and was 
overwhelmingly endorsed by the Senate, President George H.W. Bush vetoed the 
legislation on October 3, 1992, saying it “benefitted special interests, not the public” 
(Andrews, 1992).  The House and Senate overrode the veto and the Act passed two days 
later.  This was the only veto overturned during the Bush presidency (Summary of Bills 
Vetoed, George H. W. Bush). 
 On the day after the Act was passed, John Malone, head of cable giant Tele-
Communications Inc. affirmed that he was not paying to carry broadcasters’ content.  “I 
don’t intend to pay any money,” he said, “I will scratch backs (Crawford, 2013).”  Many 
cable operators followed suit, refusing to pay for retransmission consent.  As a result, 
broadcasters that choose retransmission consent seldom received cash.  Instead, they 
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received permission to distribute new cable channels, or some advertising concessions or 
some combination of both (Crawford, 2013).  ABC was one of the first broadcasters to 
make a deal to involve a new cable channel (ESPN2) by negotiating with Continental. 
“Continental will pay Capital Cities (ABC) a monthly fee, estimated at $0.12 cents a 
subscriber, to ESPN2 (Carter, 1993).  In exchange, ABC will not seek any payment for 
Continental's right to retransmit programming from broadcast stations that ABC owns 
and operates” (Carter, 1993).  Other broadcast stations were frustrated at this deal setting 
a precedent that cable stations used as a model for negotiations.  CBS who did not have a 
cable connection to negotiate, pushed for cash deals, and were public with their 
frustrations.  Jay Kriegle, senior vice president of CBS Inc. stated “We'll see how free 
this market is” and added “If five guys can say, ‘Over my dead body’, is that a free 
market (Widder, 1993)?” 
2.2.2. Satellite home viewer acts from 1994-2010.  
The Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA) of 1994 was established in response to 
the desire to update SHVA of 1988.  The SHVA of 1994 continued the compulsory 
copyright licenses for satellite companies to be able to air broadcast networks, but it 
made adjustments to the law to protect local copyrights (Satellite Home Viewer Act of 
1994).   
According to Tremaine (1994) this law affected three main areas: Fair Market 
Value, White Area Measurements, and Areas of Dominant Influence.  Fair market value 
reexamined the cost structure of the compulsory copyright license fee and brought the fee 
up to market value by 1997.  White Area Measurements defined the structure to test for 
broadcast signal availability.  Areas of Dominate Influence are described as the local 
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broadcasters service area that would receive the same content (Tremaine, 1994).  
Tremaine goes on to say that any increase in the local broadcaster’s footprint would have 
a significant effect on fees associated with licensing content. 
Over the years the changes to the law for Satellite companies was segregated from 
the changes to the laws for cable companies.  This technology simply was not 
competitive enough and the infrastructure very different to set up then cable.  The next 
Act’s attempted to keep Satellite companies appropriately up to day throughout the years. 
The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA) of 1999 extends 
retransmission consent to satellite companies along with other modifications to existing 
rules.  Under the SHVIA of 1999, if a satellite company choses to provide local channels 
to a local Designated Market Area (DMA) starting on January 1, 2002 they were required 
to deliver every local broadcast channel offered in the DMA that choose to be carried by 
the carry-one, carry-all.  Other amendments to the laws included the removal of the 90-
day waiting period.  If a consumer switched from a cable provider to a Satellite 
subscription they were no longer subjected to a waiting period.  Clarity was brought to 
the definition of an “underserved households” and procedures for testing the household 
established (Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999).   
The Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004 attempted 
to aid competition for satellite companies within the MVPD market by allowing more 
programing for satellite services (Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization 
Act of 2004). 
In 2010, the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010 also known 
as STELA renewed the licenses for satellite companies to retransmit broadcast stations 
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for the next five years.  The recent transition to digital was also included in this 
modification (Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010). 
2.2.3. Telecommunications act of 1996. 
 The Telecommunication Act of 1996 was an effort “[t]o promote competition and 
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies” (Telecommunications Act of 1996).  In reality, the 
goal of creating new competition between local phone providers, long distances services, 
internet access and cable television companies by deregulating the industry set the stage 
to create the ability for one company to provide multiple services without conflict. 
 The Act of 1996 altered the regulatory limits on the number of television, radio, 
or cable stations that one company could own in any one market.  The Internet was also 
included in the regulatory scheme covered by this Act, a significant first for the FCC.   
[B]y eliminating the restrictions on the number of television station that a person 
or entity may directly or indirectly own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable 
interest in, nationwide; and (b) by increasing the national audience reach 
limitation for television stations to 35 percent.  (2) Local ownership limitations - 
the commission shall conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether to 
retain, modify, or eliminate its limitations on the number of television stations that 
a person or entity may own, operate, or control, or have a cognizable interest in, 
within the same television market. (Telecommunications Act of 1996) 
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2.2.4. Must-carry and good faith negotiations. 
 From its initial passage in 1992, many players took issue with the rules 
established and implemented by the Cable Act of 1992.  Over the years, legal cases 
challenged the application of FCC rules as being in violation of the First Amendment, 
and some of this litigation went as high as the Supreme Court.  In the final judgment of 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting v. FCC (Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, 1997) the Court determined that must-carry requirement of the Cable Act 
was constitutional.  This decision finally answered the question of if the first amendment 
was violated when must-carry rules were established for cable television stations. 
 The evaluation of the retransmission regulatory landscape continued in the year 
2000.  In 2000, the FCC issued a First Report and Order (FCC, 2000b), “Implementation 
of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Retransmission Consent Issues: 
Good Faith Negotiation and Exclusivity” that adopted new rules for retransmission 
negotiations for cable and satellite companies. In the Order, the FCC made it clear that 
consistent with statutory consent, the FCC would not engage in detailed oversight of 
retransmission consent negotiations.  Instead, the FCC implemented and set the test for a 
good faith requirement in the retransmission negotiation process.  In the Order, the FCC 
adopted a two-part test to determine if the negotiations were conducted in good faith.  
The first part of the test for good faith in the Order (FCC, 2000b) consisted of a list of the 
following seven objective standards: 
1) A broadcaster may not refuse to negotiate with an MVPD concerning 
retransmission; 
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2) A broadcaster must appoint a representative with negotiating authority to 
bargain on retransmission issues;  
3) A broadcaster must agree to meet at reasonable times and locations and can not 
unduly delay the negotiations;  
4) A broadcaster may not present a single, unilateral proposal; 
5) A broadcaster must provide considered reasons for rejecting any provision of 
the MVPD’s offer; 
6) A broadcaster is prohibited from entering into an agreement with any party 
based on denying retransmission consent to any MVPD; and 
7) A broadcaster must agree to execute a written agreement that reflex the full 
agreement reached with the MVPD.  
 The second part of the good faith test set forth in the Order (FCC, 2000b) is based 
on the totality of circumstance. Under this test, an MVPD may present facts which 
establish a failure to negotiate in good faith based not on a violation of any or all of the 
seven standards but, instead, on the totality of circumstances.  This totality of the 
circumstances test would preclude a broadcaster from simply going through the motions 
on each of the seven requirements without intending to negotiate in overall good faith.   
 At first glance, it appears that the FCC’s test for good faith is unfairly aimed at 
the broadcaster’s role in the negotiations process.  However, any misallocation of the 
responsibility for a lack of good faith in the negotiation process appears to have been 
corrected in August 2001 when an Order on Reconsideration was released by the FCC.  
This Order (FCC, 2001) noted that after the First Report and Order was released several 
groups filed opposition.  The issues raised and discussed included: Burden of Proof, 
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Limitations Period and Effect of the Good Faith Rules on Pre-existing Negotiations.  It 
was determined that the burden of proof should be placed on the complainant, the 
MVPD. The limitation period of a single year was intended to keep complaints timely.  In 
addition, a “broadcaster’s duty to negotiate retransmission consent in good faith 
commenced upon the effective date of our good faith rules regardless of any prior course 
of negotiations” (FCC, 2001).  With this much clarification and push back, one can only 
assume there was tension in the air regarding the rates.  By allocating the burden of proof 
to the complaining MVPD to establish a failure by the broadcaster to negotiate in good 
faith, the process was effectively rebalanced. 2 
2.2.5. Summary 1992-2004.  
The 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act brought 
significant regulation to the broadcast and cable companies overseen by the FCC.  The 
FCC attempted to play a more significant role in bringing fairness to retransmission 
rights, but it was not viewed as fair by most.  The FCC’s activity following 1992 resulted 
in a considerable number of challenges to the FCC in the years following, which 
prompted the FCC to further clarify and expand with follow-up regulations.  The 1992 
Act frustrated some cable companies so much that they challenged the validity of the Act 
in the Supreme Court.   
 By 1993, retransmission consent had taken hold, and broadcasters began to 
negotiate trade deals.  These new changes in regulations were not limited to the cable 
                                                 
2 In the FCC’s Report and Order ”Implementation of Section 207 of the Satellite Home Viewer Extension 
and Reauthorization Act of 2004” released in June of 2005, Broadcasters were granted reciprocal good 
faith obligations.  At this point, broadcasters could now file a lack of good faith complaint against an 
MVPD during negotiations (FCC, 2005b).  
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companies, but also extended to the Satellite industry.  In 1999, the Satellite companies 
as well were ordered to carry-one, carry-all local broadcast station offerings.  With 
retransmission consent deals being renegotiated every three years, opportunity for 
conflict and ultimately harm to the consumer increased substantially.  Throughout the 
1990’s and into the 2000’s, these negotiations and the resulting conflict, the FCC 
expanding and clarifying the regulations, has a significant impact on the whole industry.  
By the end of 2000, the cable industry was dramatically increasing its profits.  At the 
same time, broadcasters were able to create new channels specifically distributed on 
cable and satellite formats.  
2.3. Years 2004-2010 
2.3.1. Cash payments. 
 Three cycles of retransmission consent negotiations had passed between the years 
of 1993 to 2005.  In 1993 the cable companies made it abundantly clear that they would 
not pay cash for broadcast networks.  The retransmission consent deals negotiated during 
this period tested the cable companies’ resolve on the issue of cash transactions, and with 
satellite companies having paid some cash3, the broadcast industry felt that they could 
start to push for a cash deal structure with cable.  In the broadcasters’ minds, the cable 
company’s gross profits had increased substantially, and even if they did not receive an 
all cash deal for this round of negotiations, they intended to continue to test cable’s 
                                                 
3 “Not only are the two direct-broadcast satellite providers offering an alternative to cable, telcos such as 
Verizon Communications Inc. and SBC Communications Inc. are getting into the video business.  The 
telcos are either already paying cash in exchange for retransmission consent, or are expected to do so.” 
(Moss, 2005)  
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resolve on this cash payment front.  This negotiation positioning intensified the public 
battle on retransmission. 
 In 2005, the FCC released The Eleventh Annual Report (FCC, 2005a), a report 
required by the 1992 Cable Act to monitor the progress of the media marketplace.  
Among the many questions posed by the report, one question was whether retransmission 
consent compensation resulted in new revenue payments for broadcasters--whether that 
be direct compensation or other benefits like in-kind trade or contracts for affiliated 
programming (FCC, 2005a, p. 51).  The report acknowledged that because these deals 
were negotiated in private, they were not very transparent.  In response to the FCC 
inquiry, Paxson (Communications) stated that advertising remained the primary source of 
revenue, and that alternative revenues sources were not present in any significant way 
(FCC, 2005a, p. 51).  The Walt Disney Company stated that it would offer cable systems 
the right to carry its owned station for approximately $0.70 to $0.80 per subscriber per 
month, but that a retransmission consent transaction may involve a variety of currencies 
(FCC, 2005a, p. 51).  In sum, it appeared that while the pressure for full cash offers was 
starting to become louder in the press, negotiations were moving forward with variable 
forms of compensation in play.  
 The Report addressed issues regarding retransmission consent deals related to 
satellite operators in as much as satellite companies also wanted to have their rules 
reexamined.  According to the report, in order for a Satellite company to air a local 
broadcast network in one market they must-carry all local broadcast stations.  Meaning 
that in that market “a DBS operator must-carry all station in any market where it chooses 
to carry any local television station carry-one, carry-all (FCC, 2005a, p. 85).  EchoStar, a 
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Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) provider whose product is sold in the marketplace as 
DISH Network, pleaded with the Commission to re-examine the must-carry rules as they 
applied to Satellite companies, as they felt they were at a disadvantage due to a lack of 
market power during the negotiations (FCC, 2005a, p. 85).  
 Another ongoing issue was tying together the retransmission consent to carry a 
local broadcast signal to a requirement to carry other non-broadcast networks as the same 
time.  An example of this was how EchoStar was making deals that required them to 
carry non-broadcast programming embodied in the agreement on retransmission rights 
for the local broadcast network affiliates (FCC, 2005a, p. 85). 
 Broadcasters like Fox disagreed with distributers like EchoStar (FCC, 2005a, p. 
85).  Fox argued that because the cable industry was not willing to pay cash for carrying 
network broadcast signals, they could fairly negotiate for the cable systems to carry non-
broadcast programming instead.  The NAB sided with the broadcasters as well, stating 
that the satellite carriers often would rather choose a tying option over negotiation 
because it was cheaper.  
 The rhetoric over the exchange of cash as part of these retransmission 
negotiations was very heated.  As can be seen in Table 1, for the year of 2005, there were 
twenty-one negotiations completed with four blackouts having transpired as a result 
(Zubair, 2014).  The blackouts were a first of their kind, lasting 942 days before being 
resolved.  One such blackout was between Cox, Nexstar and Mission Broadcasting 
lasting ten months.  After a deal was complete and the blackout ended, neither side gave 
detail regarding the resolution.  As one report related, 
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The spat broke out when the broadcasters demanded cash for carriage.  Cox 
refused comment on the particulars of the deal, only saying it “met all of its 
objectives.”  From the outset the MSO refused to pay cash for broadcast stations. 
Nexstar chmm/CEO Perry Sook said, “We are pleased to have reached an 
economic agreement that is acceptable to both parties”. (No Cash But Carry: Cox, 
Nexstar End Retrans Spat, 2005) 
It is widely believed that cash payments between cable companies and broadcasters were 
exchanged during this year.  However, with negotiations being conducted in private and 
information being sealed with the agreement it is nearly impossible to prove this in 
writing.  
 
 
 
Table 1.  
Retransmission Deals & Video Blackouts from the Years of 1993 to 2005 
Year Deals Station Owners 
Multichannel 
Providers Blackouts Days 
1993 2 2 1 - - 
1999 2 2 1 - - 
2000 26 17 7 2 8 
2002 1 1 1 - - 
2003 4 4 2 1 4 
2004 3 3 3 1 2 
2005 21 11 13 4 942 
Note. Adapted from “History of retrans deals and signal blackouts, 1993--2014 YTD” by A. Zubair, SNL 
Kagan.  Copyright 2016 by S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
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2.3.2. Rising costs.  
 The Twelfth Annual Video Competition Report from the FCC addressed cash 
payments being made as part of the retransmission consent negotiations. (FCC, 2006).  
The Broadband Service Providers Association expressed their concern related to rising 
compensation costs, “the ability of broadcasters to leverage retransmission consent to 
demand exorbitant compensation for programming and asks the Commission to monitor 
this situation and be prepared to take corrective action” (FCC, 2006, p. 82).  The 
American Cable Association (ACA) contended that it “could cost smaller cable 
companies and their customers an additional $1 billion over the next three years” (FCC, 
2006, p. 82).  The NAB stated that cable companies rarely pay cash for retransmission 
consent, and that even if broadcasters could obtain cash payments in return for carriage of 
their signals, the $1 billion figure cited by ACA is “fanciful at best” (FCC, 2006, p. 82). 
 The report indicates that there is now a population of broadcasters that is 
receiving traditional cash compensation that represents substantial portion of their 
revenue.  Hearst Argyle Television Inc. reported a $2.3 million increase in revenue over 
the previous year mainly due to revenue from retransmission (FCC, 2006, p. 83).  Large 
corporations, like Walt Disney Company, are taking the side of broadcasters wanting to 
be compensated.  Their stance is that broadcasters are justified in requiring the cable 
providers to pay for the right to retransmit what content they have created.  Broadcasters 
take the position that they are no different than any other business, and they need to be 
compensated for the goods they create.  They argue that they are entitled to compensation 
and state that there is no justification for changes in the retransmission consent statutes.  
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“Especially given cable operators’ increasing competition with broadcasters for local 
advertising revenue” (FCC, 2006, p. 83).   
According to Eisenach (2009), “It is also useful to compare programming costs to 
cable operators’ profits, that have increased substantially in recent years.” Eisenach 
states, “Total gross profits increased from $48.96 per subscriber per month in 2003 to 
$62.99 per subscriber per month in 2006, an increase of $14.03, or 29 percent” (Eisenach, 
2009). 
2.3.3. Request for FCC involvement.   
In January of 2007 a retransmission consent blackout battle began between 
Mediacom Communications Group, Inc. (the cable company) and Sinclair Broadcast 
Group (the broadcast channel owner).  There are a few notable points of interest in this 
blackout battle.  First, this negotiation deadline was originally delayed from the end of 
2006 into the beginning of 2007 in hopes to avoid a blackout.  Second, at risk for the 
customers in Des Moines and Cedar Rapids Iowa was the NFL playoffs programming on 
Sinclair’s broadcast channels.  The most interesting aspect of this blackout scenario was 
that Mediacom requested the FCC to intervene in the stalemated negotiations.  Mediacom 
believed that Sinclair was demanding too high a price to air their programming and filed 
a good faith complaint with the FCC.  The FCC declined to intervene.  As Wilford (2007) 
points out, 
A lawsuit Mediacom filed against Sinclair alleging discriminatory pricing is still 
pending.  Mediacom also complained to the Federal Communications 
Commission that Sinclair was negotiating in bad faith, but was turned down by 
the FCC's Media Board.  Mediacom has offered to take the same deal that Sinclair 
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gave Time Warner, but Sinclair refuses.  Mediacom also has pressed for the two 
sides to enter into binding arbitration, but Sinclair has refused.  
Sinclair responded to the request for FCC intervention stating that while the two 
sides had grievances, they should be able to work them out. While the Joint Government 
Oversight Committee of the Iowa Legislature held a hearing, the FCC ended up stating 
that it did not “it doesn't have the authority to settle these disputes” (Wilford, 2007).  The 
dispute was subsequently resolved shortly before the Super Bowl was set to air.   
2.3.4. Changes in the economy and technology. 
In 2008, almost every sector of the economy was dramatically affected by the 
recession.  In the advertising business, the pain proved especially acute, compounded by 
the forecasts of where advertising budgets would be in 2009.  “Every one of the 
traditional media platforms is getting hit, with newspapers (no surprise) taking the brunt 
of the pressure, with a drop of 17%, followed by TV (minus 15.5%), magazines (minus 
15%), and radio (minus 13%)” (Rayport, 2008).  The downward trend in advertising 
revenue pushed the industry to reevaluate their revenue streams.  Retransmission consent 
fees seemed to be a light at the end of the tunnel for businesses, like broadcasters, heavily 
reliant on advertising revenue. 
While the economy was still in turmoil, broadcasters were still obligated to move 
forward on the FCC’s plan to transition broadcasters to Digital Television (DTV), a 
process that was completed on June 12, 2009 (FCC, 2009).  This evolution ended the era 
of broadcasting analog signals to the public that had been the popular viewing format 
since television sets became popular in individual households.  The transition completed 
a 13-year process that freed up broadcast spectrum for other technical uses like wireless 
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Internet services.  It also gave over-the-air broadcasters a higher resolution signal sent 
directly to consumer’s houses.  This transition was a complicated and expensive 
transition for the broadcast stations and the government to accomplish. 
The DTV transition could be a research topic on it’s own.  The resulting years of 
delays and the political maneuvering leveraged to accomplish the task started as early as 
the 1990’s.  From the consumer’s perspective, every television they owned needed either 
to have a digital antenna built into it like newer models or a converter box obtained for 
the older models.  Outlining these changes, Galparin (2004) noted that, 
 It requires a complete retooling of the existing video production and distribution 
infrastructure, from studio camera to transmission towers…Along with the 
transition, fundamental questions have surfaced about the funding of broadcasting 
services, the protection of copyright, and the obligations of broadcasters vis-à-vis 
the electoral process, to mention a few examples, which have led policymakers to 
rethink the existing rules of the game for television.  
Many action steps were needed to successfully pull off the DTV transition and the 
completion date was pushed many times along the way.  The original termination date 
was set for December 31, 2006.  As many as 368 stations ended their analog option on 
February 17, 2009, one of the final push back transition dates (FCC, 2009).  The effort for 
broadcasters was primarily behind the scenes.  The structure changes and the expenses 
incurred took much of the broadcasters time and attention. 
2.3.5. Blackouts.   
2010 was a year of determination for all parties involved, on every side of the 
retransmission consent fight.  Cablevision and The Walt Disney Company began fighting 
33 
in March (Kleinfield, 2010) followed by Cablevision and News Corporation in October 
(Drawbaugh, 2010).  The series of public standoffs affected many Cablevision customers 
in major metropolitan cities leading the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on 
Communications, Technology & the Internet to hold a meeting regarding Cable & 
Broadcast TV carriage negotiations (Television Viewers, Retransmission Consent, and 
the Public Interest, 2010).  To close the year out, Time Warner Cable and Sinclair 
Broadcast Group had a very public debate about arbitration regarding a retransmission 
consent contract expiring on December 31, 2010 (Time Warner Cable Effectively 
Refuses to Arbitrate Retransmission Consent Negotiation with Sinclair, 2010). 
 On March 7th 2010, Cablevision and The Walt Disney Company (parent to New 
York’s WABC station) engaged in a battle over retransmission consent that hit a turning 
point.  With the Academy Awards set to air live later that night The Walt Disney 
Company pulled WABC’s signal at noon Sunday morning. This was not the first blackout 
for Cablevision’s consumers, but with the high profile event and the New York, New 
Jersey and Connecticut DMA at risk, the blackout was a very strategic move for publicity 
on both sides of the case.  Customers in the DMA struggled to find a back up option for 
viewing the live event at last minute notice.  With confusion still lingering from the DTV 
transition, customers were upset about the blackout.  The blackout ended when the parties 
agreed to a verbal settlement, and the programming was restored to Cablevision 
customers about twenty minutes into the Academy Awards (Kleinfield, 2010).  The 
public attention brought by the situation pushed the limits of the consumers as well as 
lawmakers who felt like the FCC should intervene. 
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Later in the year, October of 2010, Cablevision was at it again, this time with 
News Corporation (Drawbaugh, 2010).  The two-week blackout included Fox in New 
York and Philadelphia as well as three Fox Cable channels, equaling around three million 
homes (Gelles, 2010).  This time News Corporation used the World Series to pressure 
Cablevision into a deal.  Over the course of the fifteen day blackout, the two sides took to 
pushing their view of the battle in opposing advertisements, press releases and Internet 
posts on websites. “News Corp. accused Cablevision of ‘hypocrisy’ Cablevision blamed 
Fox's ‘corporate greed’” (Stahl, 2010).  Cablevision encouraged the FCC chairman to 
intervene in the situation.  The FCC, once again, pressured both sides to end the blackout 
but would not engage in the conversations.  “Cablevision and Fox are spending more 
time attacking each other through ads and lobbyists than sitting down at the negotiating 
table,” said Julius Genachowski, chairman of the FCC (Gelles, 2010). 
Cablevision made an offer “to pay the same rate for Fox as a rival cable operator” 
(Stahl, 2010).  News Corp ended up rejecting the offer.  As time went on the news 
surrounding the impasse swelled.  The two sides finally came to an agreement on their 
own accord and the FCC did not have to play a role in the disagreement.  “Cablevision 
has agreed to pay Fox an unfair price for multiple channels of its programming including 
many in which our customers have little or no interest.”  They went on to say, 
“[Cablevision] conceded because it does not think its customers should any longer be 
denied the Fox programs they wish to see” (Stahl, 2010).   
 With the blackouts becoming a dramatic public spectacle throughout the year, in 
November of 2010, Senator John F. Kerry, Chairman for the Commerce Subcommittee 
on Communications, Technology and the Internet, called for a public hearing.  In Mr. 
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Kerry’s opening statement he said, “Our goal is to discuss alternative ways to resolve 
these disagreements and to protect the consumers…Our predilection is not to get 
involved.”  He then later states, “…negotiations between programmers and distributors, 
although private, are strongly affected by statutory and regulatory requirements and 
cannot be properly characterized as just  ‘free market’” (Television Viewers, 
Retransmission Consent, and the Public Interest, 2010).  
  At one point in this hearing, Thomas Rutledge, COO of Cablevision, stated, “the 
rules that allowed this blackout were created by the Congress and administered by the 
FCC, but the FCC claimed it had no power to restore the programming.”  The U.S. 
Senate did not want to get involved in the parties’ dispute either but wanted to understand 
why the citizens they represent are feeling stuck in the middle (Television Viewers, 
Retransmission Consent, and the Public Interest, 2010).  As the hearing continued, a 
dividing line was drawn between those who wanted the rules revised and those who felt 
that there was no problem. 
Time Warner Cable (TWC) and Sinclair Broadcast Group battled over a 
December 31st contract deadline (Time Warner Cable Effectively Refuses to Arbitrate 
Retransmission Consent Negotiation with Sinclair, 2010).  With five million TWC 
subscribers in the middle, the suggestion of arbitration seemed encouraged but as 
negotiations hit a stalemate, press releases are published back and forth with language 
such as: 
Although Time Warner Cable may claim that it is prepared to submit the matter to 
arbitration, any such commitment is illusory in light of the unreasonable 
conditions that Time Warner Cable placed upon its so-called consent to 
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arbitration. (Time Warner Cable Effectively Refuses to Arbitrate Retransmission 
Consent Negotiation with Sinclair, 2010) 
The fight was purposely made to involve the public but in the end the contract was 
extended for another two weeks to allow them more negotiating time with no blackout 
during the New Years holiday.  
2.3.6. Summary 2004-2010. 
New shifts in technology began to affect the television industry before anyone in 
who was embroiled in these arguments realized it.  Between 2005 and 2010, the transition 
from analog television to digital television completed a long-term objective.  While the 
shift to digital was taking place, the Internet started becoming a viable source for video 
content and began change the landscape for the broadcasters and the MVPDs.  
While this major technological shift was taking place in television, the U.S. 
economy headed into a fiscal downturn.  This forced the industry to grasp a new reality 
of an economically-challenged income stream, heavily affected by alternative platforms 
for advertisers where revenue models were still being tested.  In a down economy, all 
businesses look to cut their advertising budgets, and this hit television hard.  Broadcasters 
looked to the new precedent of receiving revenue from the cable providers via 
retransmission deals.  In fact, broadcasters began to push for more retransmission revenue 
as a viable source of income.   
This push for cash created a year filled with strategically blacking-out highly 
anticipated events in highly viewed DMA’s.  Often cable called broadcast’s bluff, and 
they pulled on-air content.  The FCC notes this in their twelfth report on the industry 
(FCC, 2006).  This tactic was employed again on a much larger scale in 2010 when 
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Cablevision and The Walt Disney Company blacked out the Academy Awards for 
approximately the first 20 minutes to get their point across (Kleinfield, 2010), and again 
when Cablevision and News Corporation blackout out the Major League Baseball event 
(Gelles, 2010). 
While the cable viewing public got short-changed and angry, the FCC continued to 
take the position that they had no grounds to intervene.  The Senate committee hearing on 
this subject demonstrated a real concern for the public’s interest, but the debate showed 
how both sides were clearly divided (Television Viewers, Retransmission Consent, and 
the Public Interest, 2010). 
2.4. Years 2011-2015 
2.4.1. Reverse retransmission consent.  
In March of 2011, in response to a petition, the FCC announced that it was 
seeking comments on proposed rulemaking issues concerning retransmission consent. 
These issues, found in FCC (2011) included: 
a) further clarification of the totality of circumstances test of the good faith 
negotiation requirement; 
b) a proposed requirement of notice to consumers in advance of service 
disruptions; 
c) a proposed definition of what it meant to unreasonably delay negotiations; 
d) whether joint station negotiations should be allowed when the stations were 
not commonly owned; and 
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e) whether it would be a per se violation of good faith for an entity to refuse to 
agree to non-binding mediation when there was an impasse 30 days before 
expiration of an agreement.  
Of the many issues open for comment, an additional issue spoke directly to the 
subject of a network’s involvement in the negotiating process.  The FCC asked whether it 
should be a per se violation of the good faith requirement for a station to give a network 
with which it was affiliated the right to approve (or reject) a retransmission consent 
agreement with an MVPD.  It has been suggested that such a contractual provision 
impaired a station’s obligation to designate a representative with authorization to 
negotiate.  If the network had the final say-so concerning an agreement, then the station’s 
representative arguably did not have the requisite authority herself.  Comments were thus 
sought on the appropriate parameters of network involvement in the negotiating process 
(FCC, 2011).  
As part of this issue, the Commission also asked: “If the Commission decides to 
prohibit stations from granting networks the right to approve their affiliates’ 
retransmission consent agreements, should we, on a going-forward basis, abrogate any 
provisions restricting an affiliate’s power to grant retransmission consent without 
network approval that appear in existing agreements (FCC, 2011, pp. 13-14).”  In effect, 
the FCC was asking if delays in negotiations were being caused by a network’s 
involvement in negotiations, and if such involvement was presumptively inappropriate, 
should the Commission negate any existing contractual provisions providing the 
networks with such participation authority.  As a result, network involvement in the 
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negotiating process was becoming a major talking point, with reverse compensation 
being seen as a significant new revenue source. 
According to (Stelter, 2011), a NY Times article in July of 2011, Southern 
Missouri consumers were the latest victims of a network-motivated position in 
negotiations.  The Fox network wanted to have a consistent and anticipated cash flow 
from year to year and insisted on a flat fee.  Fox did not want to depend on a local 
affiliate’s ability to negotiate retransmission consent deals that provided an unknown 
percentage of reverse compensation due to limited deal making ability.  The Missouri 
example was not the first time an affiliate was asked to pay a fee to the network for 
programming, but the fee previously had been determined based on advertising revenue. 
 The payment plan set up in the same time period by ABC, a unit of the Walt 
Disney Company, was a combination of Fox’s flat fee plan and NBC’s proposed plan: a 
flat fee or a share of a station’s retransmission fees, whichever was greater.  Each of the 
plans was a new and significant step in the efforts of the networks to develop new 
revenue streams.  The networks justified the new fees by saying they were needed in 
order to keep supplying prime-time programs and sustain profitability for their parent 
companies, thus following the cable model of a dual revenue stream of advertising and 
subscriber fees (Stelter, 2011). 
NBC said in a statement at the time that the fee arrangement plan would be a win 
for both the network and the stations because both “need to develop additional revenue 
streams to offset the high cost of producing local and national programming and news” 
(Stelter, 2011). 
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Fox chose a different route, insisting on a flat fee that was not directly tied to 
stations’ retransmission fees. The network was said to expect roughly 25 cents a month 
per viewer who received the station via a cable or satellite company, escalating after the 
first year.  In a letter to stations, Fox made it clear that it was playing hardball, stating 
that if Fox’s proposal did not work for some stations, the network would look for 
alternative channels of distribution (Stelter, 2011). 
Through the solicitation in 2011 of comments on a range of issues, the FCC 
initiated a process to develop and institute changes in the retransmission consent process.  
This process highlighted the growing importance of the networks’ desire for an additional 
revenue stream, which was sought at the expense of the broadcasters became known as 
reverse retransmission consent. 
2.4.2. The cable act at 20.  
The number of retransmission consent deals reached in 2012 was at an all-time high of 
seventy-nine as shown in   
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Table 2.  The number of signal blackouts that occurred that year as a result of 
negotiation impasses twenty-one, an all-time high.  Even more staggering was the new 
record of 1,088 blackout days during the year (Zubair, 2014). 
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Table 2.  
Retransmission Deals & Video Blackouts from the Years of 1993 to 2014 
Year Deals Station Owners 
Multichannel 
Providers Blackouts Days 
1993 2 2 1 - - 
1999 2 2 1 - - 
2000 26 17 7 2 8 
2002 1 1 1 - - 
2003 4 4 2 1 4 
2004 3 3 3 1 2 
2005 21 11 13 4 942 
2006 9 7 7 2 38 
2007 14 6 9 1 27 
2008 27 16 12 7 642 
2009 28 10 13 4 219 
2010 21 12 10 4 43 
2011 45 33 13 11 400 
2012 79 41 23 21 1088 
Note. Adapted from “History of retrans deals and signal blackouts, 1993--2014 YTD” by A. Zubair, SNL 
Kagan.  Copyright 2016 by S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
 
 
 
No one in the industry was pleased with the increased number of blackout dates.  
When an opportunity arose, industry members would point to someone other than 
themselves as the cause of ongoing disruption.  At the same time, with the continuing 
increases in cable subscription prices, consumers had grown increasingly dissatisfied. 
Against this backdrop of concern, on July 24, 2012, the Senate Commerce 
Committee conducted a hearing on The Cable Act at 20 to examine changes in the market 
and to determine how to better serve consumers.  Rather than being a celebratory 
birthday party for the 1992 Act, industry fault lines were exposed and strong 
disagreements established.  The hearing was also broadcast to the public by C-SPAN.  
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In order to best analyze the feelings behind the review, selected remarks from the 
following presenters illustrate the industry divide: 
a) Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV is a senator from West Virginia whom 
presided over the Senate Commerce Committee at that time; 
b) Hon. Gordon H. Smith is the President and CEO of National Association 
of Broadcasters; 
c)  Melinda Witmer is the Executive Vice President and Chief Video and 
Content Officer for Time Warner Cable; 
d) Martin D. Franks is Executive Vice President of Planning, Policy and 
Government Affairs, for CBS Corporation;  
e) Colleen Abdoulah is Chairwoman and Chief Executive Officer for WOW! 
Internet, Cable, and Phone as well as Chairwoman of the American Cable 
Association; and 
f) Dr. Mark Cooper is Director of Research for Consumer Federation of 
America. 
In opening the hearing, Chairman Rockefeller noted the need to “make sure that 
consumers do not continue to get caught in the crossfire of programming disputes, facing 
dark screens and losing access to news, sports, and other entertainment programming” 
(C-Span, 2012).  Although many argue that the Cable Act achieved its goals, Senator 
Rockefeller did not go along with that notion.  Consumers felt that they were paying too 
much and received little in return in terms of content choice.  “Real competition should 
be driving rates down and it should be driving development …and spurring new 
innovative products” (C-Span, 2012).  The Senator stated that his aim for the hearing was 
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to determine how to do a better job of protecting consumers,  to make sure that they were 
getting what they wanted, that they did not have to pay more than they should for it, and 
to ensure that the companies were putting consumers first. 
Former Senator Gordon Smith, President and CEO of the National Association of 
Broadcasters, emphasized the indispensable role that local television stations play in 
providing local news, often including lifesaving coverage in times of emergency.  From 
the broadcasters’ perspective, there was no need to rewrite existing legal provisions to 
eliminate retransmission consent and must-carry.  Retransmission consent was not 
broken; it was working as intended, according to broadcasters.  They asserted that over 
99% of retransmission consent deals were completed without any disruption of service; 
and, broadcasters were not the cause of rising cable fees.  The viability of local service is 
tied to the ability of broadcasters to negotiate for fair value and carriage through 
retransmission consent agreements (C-Span, 2012).   
Ms. Melinda Witmer, from Time Warner Cable, took the position that 
retransmission consent was broken and needed to be eliminated.  She suggested that 
retransmission consent and must-carry were special privileges and subsidies given to 
broadcasters through the 1992 Act.  Further, she asserted that the number of blackouts 
had increased significantly as a result of retransmission consent and expected that there 
would be additional increases in the future.  She was of the opinion that broadcasters 
were using threats of blackouts for bargaining leverage and that retransmission consent 
resulted in ever increasing cable prices.  The networks were demanding their own slice of 
negotiated retransmission fees.  This resulted in even higher price increases.  According 
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to Ms. Witmer, parts of the 1992 Act simply were no longer needed, especially 
retransmission consent (C-Span, 2012).   
On behalf of CBS, Martin D. Franks stated the position that retransmission 
consent was neither broken nor was it an antique in need of refurbishment.  He explained 
that in the previous six years, CBS had successfully negotiated nearly 100 retransmission 
agreements without any public discord and that while any disruptions to consumers were 
unfortunate, only a handful of negotiations in the market broke down each year.  CBS felt 
that this was evidence of a robust retransmission marketplace that had helped CBS and its 
affiliates invest billions to retain marquee programming, and to continue its considerable 
investment in local and national news (C-Span, 2012).   
Mr. Franks testified that far from being flawed, retransmission consent is a 
triumph of Washington policymaking having restored balance and competition to a sector 
previously dominated by a monopoly.  Rather than having a legitimate public policy 
problem, there is instead an unholy alliance among distributors that are supposed to 
compete with each other but who have, instead, banded together to undo retransmission 
consent in order to deprive broadcasters of appropriately deserved compensation.  Mr. 
Franks stated that CBS would do fine even without retransmission consent, but he warned 
that many smaller players, both broadcasters and small cable operators, would be 
squeezed out of the business (C-Span, 2012).   
To the contrary, Colleen Abdoulah of the American Cable Association testified 
that there was serious harm caused by the current outdated rules.  The American Cable 
Association represents the small players in the cable market, with eighty-two percent of 
members serving fewer than five thousand customers.  She explained that eight hundred 
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small cable systems had literally gone out of business in the last four years due, in part, to 
escalating retransmission fees and overall programming costs (C-Span, 2012).  Ms. 
Abdoulah stated that the small cable operators were getting squeezed out, that 
programming and retransmission consent negotiations were failing, resulting in blackouts 
affecting tens of millions of viewers.  Further the ACA took the position that 
retransmission fees are skyrocketing, and consumers are paying the price.  Media 
consolidation has led to rampant tying and bundling of unwatched programming, and that 
the big broadcasting cable networks were paying astronomical fees for sports 
programming knowing that they could pass the cost to consumers.  In fact, since 1992, 
the tidal wave of media consolidation between broadcasters and cable networks gave 
enormous bargaining power to the Big 4 networks.  In addition, the ACA cited many 
cases where separately owned, same-market broadcasters coordinate their retransmission 
consent negotiations.  Abdoulah stated that the broadcasters use a benign term for the 
collusion – “shared services agreements” (C-Span, 2012). The impact of their collusion is 
that broadcasters who are supposed to be competing with one another use one single 
broker to negotiate carriage rights for two or more competing stations.  
Dr. Mark Cooper, Director of Research at the Consumer Federation, was critical 
of both broadcasters and cable operators.  Dr. Cooper testified that relentless cable price 
increases continued because the markets remained highly concentrated.  Competition had 
been further undermined by a series of mergers, which culminated in mergers like 
Comcast/NBC and joint ventures like Verizon and big cable.  A focus of Dr. Cooper’s 
criticism was the grant by Congress of lucrative retransmission rights to broadcasters. 
Congress gave broadcasters the retransmission rights without imposing any new 
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responsibilities.  Broadcasters have used their retransmission rights to build cable-
programming bundles and force them onto the cable networks.  The cable operators were 
not innocent in this.  Broadcasters had leveraged their retransmissions to respond to the 
cable operators’ vertical market power. Bargaining over retransmission had become ugly, 
and no matter who ultimately won between the cable operator and the broadcasters, the 
consumer always lost (C-Span, 2012).  The public lost access to programming, was 
frequently forced to pay more for programming, and was always forced to buy massive 
amounts of programming that was not being watched.  Dr. Cooper emphasized that the 
“original sin” was not compulsory copyright or retransmission but, instead, the 
broadcasters’ exclusive broadcast licenses.  According to Dr. Cooper, if Congress 
intended to bring spectrum and video policy into the 21st century, it should move the 
broadcasters out of the way and provide the maximum opportunity for all the people to 
use the public airways for their public purposes (C-Span, 2012).   
 So, did things work as intended during the first 20 years of the Cable Act, or is the 
system broken? And, why are consumers subsidizing the various industry participants by 
paying the increased costs that are passed through in higher fees?  One thing is clear, the 
industry divisions and battle lines have been firmly drawn. 
2.4.3. Growing fees.   
 In the summer of 2013 a contract dispute between Time Warner Cable (TWC) 
and CBS took an interesting and very public turn. “Executives on both sides 
acknowledged early in the talks that CBS was seeking an increase to about $2 per 
subscriber, up from about $1 (Carter, 2013).”  Like other failed retransmission 
negotiations, a blackout of CBS’s channels (CBS and Showtime) was in effect for TWC 
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customers in New York, Los Angeles, and Dallas.  Neither filed a complaint alleging 
failure to negotiate in good faith; therefore, in the FCC’s eyes the parties involved 
addressed the matter.  CBS added a new strategic move by deliberately not allowing 
TWC customers to view episodes of their programming available on their website.  This 
approach of blocking on-line use of programming to a specific customer was new and 
untested, and the FCC still believed they had no grounds to get involved.  This excerpt 
from Spangler (2013) depicts the concern:  
The commission of course is actively monitoring the status of this particular 
dispute and is in fact in touch with both parties,” she [Mignon Clyburn, acting 
head of the FCC] said. “That consumers and viewers are being adversely affected, 
and my primary concern — we will continue to urge all parties to stay and resolve 
in good faith this issue as soon as possible. However, I will affirm to you that I 
am ready to consider appropriate action if this dispute continues. 
The blackout ended after a month-long stalemate.  “We are receiving fair 
compensation for CBS content, Mr. Moonves said [on behalf of CBS].  He specifically 
included not only additional fees for CBS content, but also the retention of the digital 
rights” (Carter, 2013).  Since this dispute ended, the strategic blocking of on-line content 
has become rare and with the changes in net neutrality rules, may be a game of the past. 
  Still another strategy that gained momentum in 2013 was the rise of reverse 
retransmission consent fees.  Reverse retransmission fees were included within network 
fees previously but, as retransmission consent fees continued to grow, the networks 
wanted a larger percentage to obtain the programming that they offered.  This growth can 
be seen in Figure 1.  According to SNL’s Economics of Broadcast TV Retransmission 
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Revenue report (Economics of broadcast TV retransmission revenue, 2013) the reverse 
retrains payments began in 2011 with around $588 million and are predicated to grow to 
$3.2 billion in 2018. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: TV Station Reverse Retransmission Fees for the Years of 2012 to 2016 
Reprinted from “Economics of Broadcast TV Retransmission Revenue”. Copyright 2013 by SNL Kagan.  
 
 
 
 The rise of retransmission consent income for 21st Century Fox Inc in 2013 is a 
good example of how the trend towards increased revenue in this area.  Fox stated that 
the television segment reported a rise of 30% OIBDA (Operating Income Before 
Depreciation and Amortization) thanks to a doubling of retransmission consent revenue 
(James, 2013).  At the same time, from 2012 to 2013, Fox raised their reverse 
retransmission consent revenue per subscriber per month from $0.23 to $0.35 (Broadcast 
retransmission fee projections through 2022, 2016).  These numbers are important 
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example of the trend in this area, because as retransmission consent rates grew, a local 
broadcast station would have to account for reverse retransmission rates to grow as well. 
2.4.4. Aereo testing the limits. 
On February 14, 2012 a startup company named Aereo, Inc. announced their 
Series A funding of over $20.5 Million dollars (Cox, 2012).  Aereo claimed to provide a 
system that would enable a consumer to receive local broadcasting from a remote 
location for viewing and recording. 
[A]n easy to use, proprietary remote antenna and DVR that consumers can use to 
access network television on web-enabled devices such as smartphones and 
tablets, and through Internet TV solutions such as AppleTV and Roku.  Aereo's 
members will have access to all of the major networks including CBS, NBC, 
FOX, ABC, CW and PBS, as well as other local channels and will have the ability 
to store up to 40 hours of programming through their Remote DVR. (Cox, 2012) 
This claim threatened not only the retransmission consent revenue that broadcasters were 
enjoying, but also the cable system as a whole.  If Aereo were successful in fighting off 
legal challenges to its recording an individual’s portion of over-the-air television with an 
individual antenna, they would change the market place of viewing content. 
 A case against Aereo made it’s way to the Supreme Court of the United States in 
April of 2014 with a decision declared on June 25, 2014.  The Supreme Court ruled 
against Aereo saying that the company violated the broadcasters ownership over the 
copyrights of the performances being transmitted (American Broadcasting v. Aereo, Inc, 
2014). 
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The Supreme Court's decision on Aereo broke down the public performance issue 
into whether Aereo performs broadcast TV, and if so, whether Aereo publicly 
performs broadcast TV.  The Supreme Court supported its finding that Aereo 
performs broadcast TV with three indicators of Congressional intent. First, the 
text of the 1976 Copyright Act defines "perform" as "to show its images in any 
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible," which Aereo does 
when subscribers request to watch a broadcast program.  Second, Congress added 
the transmit clause in the 1976 Copyright Act to ensure that cable systems were 
considered public performers.  Third, Congress included a detailed compulsory 
licensing scheme in the Act for cable systems to pay retransmission fees to 
broadcasters.  The Court reasoned that Congress would not have constructed the 
statute as such if it did not intend for a service like Aereo to perform under the 
Act. (Consiglio, 2014) 
The extreme interest in this new technology, testing the limits of the law, was 
perhaps the most significant recent example of how quickly new technology could 
threaten the existing business model.  Had the case been decided in a different direction, 
the broadcasters model would have been forever changed.   
2.4.5. Satellite television extension and localism act. 
Throughout 2014, there were many attempts to modify the Satellite Television 
Extension and Localism Act (STELA) of 2014.  In May of 2014, a new version of 
STELA was introduced known as The Satellite Television Access And Viewer Rights 
Act (STAVRA).  STAVRA was passed by the House in July but never made it passed the 
Senate (H.R. 4572 (113th): STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014, 2014).  The bill went 
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through several revisions before September 2014 when a provision known as Local 
Choice was taken out of the proposal that attempted to turn broadcast networks into a la 
carte options within an MVPD subscription (Daly, 2014).  Another bill known as the 
Satellite Television Access and Viewer Right Act was introduced in September of 2014 
and attempted to extend the protection for Satellite companies to avoid retransmission 
consent negotiations for distant households until 2020.  This was also not endorsed by 
Congress (S. 2799 (113th): Satellite Television Access and Viewer Rights Act, 2014).  
Finally H.R. 5728 STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014 was signed into law on 
December 4, 2014 (H.R. 5728 (113th): STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014, 2014). 
In 2014, the FCC established an amendment to STELA that prohibited joint 
negotiations.  The amendment was aimed at the top four broadcast television stations in a 
single DMA from being able to jointly negotiate with another station if the stations were 
not commonly owned.  This amendment was targeted at assisting in “promoting 
competition among Top Four broadcast stations for MVPD carriage of their signals and 
the associated retransmission consent revenues” (FCC, 2014b).  Specifically, the 
Commission noted in the rulemaking that agreements not to compete or to fix prices are 
“inconsistent with competitive marketplace considerations and the good faith negotiation 
requirement” (FCC, 2014b) 
At the end of 2014 the FCC created a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would 
add online video providers to the definition of MVPD.  MB Docket No. 14-261 proposed 
that no matter the technology used if programming was available for purchase it should 
be classified under the MVPD category and rules (FCC, 2014a).  This proposed rule 
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sought comment due in early 2015, but to date has not moved forward in the processes 
from this state.  
2.4.6. The current state of retransmission consent. 
Every year developments related to retransmission consent seem to increase 
exponentially.  In 2015, the ACA and several of the big cable companies continued to 
fight to make retransmission consent a prime target for legislative revision.  2015 was a 
big year for regulatory motion within the government with the current FCC chairman, 
Tom Wheeler, at the helm of the FCC.  In 2015, the government seemed to catch up with 
the complaints from the MVPD industry and started to get involved. 
In April of 2015, the Sixteenth Report of Annual Assessment of the Status of 
Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming was released.  This 
report focused on the video marketplace in 2013, but is the most relevant report provided 
by the FCC to date.  The FCC broke the industry down into three groups: MVPD’s, 
Broadcasters, and Online Video Distributors (OVDs).  In the report, retransmission 
consent is mentioned over sixty times emphasizing the polarization between the groups 
with an interest in the subject.  The report cites three variables involved in the ongoing 
debate:  pricing, competition, and revenue.  Within the broadcast industry the report 
provided Table 3 below (FCC, 2015a). 
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Table 3. 
Broadcast Television Station Industry Revenue Trends in Millions  
Revenue Sources 2011 2012 2013 (Projected) 
Advertising $18,636  $20,838  $19,379  
Network Compensations $25   <$1  < $1  
Retransmission Consent $1,757  $2,387  $3,305  
Online $1,195  $1,375  $1,485  
Total $21,617  $24,600  $24,169  
Percent Change -3% 14% -2% 
Note. Adapted from “16th Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery 
of Video Programming” by FCC, 2015, MB Docket No. 14-16, FCC 15-41, p.90.  
 
 
 
The chart continues to show the substantial upward trend of Retransmission Consent fees 
and it also shows the perspective of fees to total revenue to a broadcast station, an 
important piece of information.  
Also in April of 2015, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a 
Report to Congressional Requesters regarding “Broadcast Exclusivity Rules Effects of 
Elimination Would Depend on Other Federal Actions and Industry Response” (GAO, 
2015).  This study was intended to provide Congress with enough basic information 
about the industry to understand intended and unintended consequences of changing 
exclusivity rules.  The report states that: 
[T]he exclusivity rules are needed to protect local television stations’ contractual 
rights to be the exclusive providers of network content…by protecting 
exclusivity, the rules support station revenues, including fees from cable operators 
paid in return for retransmitting (or providing) the stations to their subscribers.  
On the flip side Conversely, cable industry stakeholders report that the rules limit 
options for providing high-demand content, such as professional sports, to their 
subscribers by requiring them to do so by retransmitting the local stations in the 
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markets they serve.  As a result, these stakeholders report that the rules may lead 
to higher retransmission consent fees, which may increase the fees households 
pay for cable service. (GAO, 2015) 
 Both of the report and study mentioned above provide insight into this ongoing 
debate and the problems and issues to be confronted by decision makers.   
2.4.7. FCC BLOG posts. 
By August 12, 2015, following years of debate and discussion, Chairman Wheeler 
released a blog on the FCC website titled “Upgrading Media Rules to Better Serve 
Consumers in Today’s Video Marketplace” (Wheeler, 2015).  In this post, Wheeler 
discussed his “circulating a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)” to review the so-
called “totality of the circumstances test” for good faith negotiations over retransmission 
of broadcast TV signals.  He explained that the list of standards is set in place so that 
negotiations are conducted in good faith and further that “[E]ven if the specific per se 
standards are met, the Commission may consider whether, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, a party has failed to negotiate retransmission consent in good faith.”  Also 
that “The NPRM currently before the Commission undertakes a robust examination of 
practices used by parties in retransmission consent negotiations, as required by 
Congress”.  The goal of this is to guarantee that negotiations are fair and that the parties 
have the consumer first in mind. (Wheeler, 2015)  
2.4.8. FCC involvement. 
According to SNL Kagan, the number of publicly reported broadcast agreements 
that were closed in 2015 totaled forty-five.  This number of deals involved thirty-two 
broadcasters and eleven MVPD’s with 496 stations in 365 markets.  With all those deals 
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in place and sixteen blackouts between them, one dispute topped the rest, incited the 
media attention, as well as a very interesting case of follow up action by the FCC, 
involved Sinclair Broadcast Group and Dish Network.  The dispute involved over one 
hundred stations in seventy-six markets, and was the “largest single TV blackout in 
history in terms of channels dropped” (Spangler, 2015).  This blackout lasted for only one 
day, August 25-26.  The timing behind the Sinclair/Dish blackout and related events is 
seemingly tied to news from the FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler.   
The blackout between Sinclair Broadcast Group and Dish Network placed profits 
and consumers in the thick of the dispute.  Dish Network filed a good faith complaint 
with the FCC earlier in August  “accusing Sinclair of violating the good-faith covenants.”  
Thereafter, Dish intended on amending the complaint to add the “allegations that Sinclair 
has tied the retrains[mission] talks to carriage of the unnamed cable channel” (Spangler, 
2015).  This dispute and request for emergency intervention began on August 25th, 2015.  
On August 26th Chairman Wheeler made a public statement as the FCC was preparing to 
become involved in this negotiation.  
 “Last night, DISH requested an emergency order for injunctive relief, alleging 
violations of the Commission’s rules requiring good faith negotiations...The 
public interest is the Commission's responsibility. We will not stand idly by while 
millions of consumers in 79 markets across the country are being denied access to 
local programming. The Commission will always act within the scope of its 
authority if it emerges that improper conduct is preventing a commercial 
resolution of the dispute.” (FCC, 2015e) 
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This comment by the FCC was in blatant opposition to the case in 2007, where 
the FCC left the parties work out their disputes without intervention (Section 2.3.3).  
Interesting, Sinclair was even one of the party’s involved in the 2007 complaint.  In 2015, 
both parties were allowed until midnight to present their side of the story to the FCC.  By 
the end of the day on August 26, Chairman Wheeler released another press release 
stating, “I am pleased DISH and Sinclair have agreed to end of the of the largest 
blackouts in history and extend their negotiations.  The FCC will remain vigilant while 
the negotiations continue” (FCC, 2015d).  The timing and intensity of the blackout with a 
threatened FCC intervention demonstrated a new active role for the FCC in negotiation 
impasses. 
In November 2015, the FCC denied another complaint of lack of good faith 
negotiations; this time from Northwest Broadcasting against DIRECTV (FCC, 2015c).  
The complaint alleged that “DIRECTV violated its duty to negotiate retransmission 
consent in good-faith…Northwest requested that DIRECTV provide similar pricing 
information so the parties can establish a fair market value for the Northwest stations’ 
signals.”  DIRECTV had refused to offer any information that Northwest had requested.  
In the end, the FCC stated that “We reject these claims raised by Northwest.”  The 
established good faith tests were not met and the totality of circumstance tested did not 
meet the burden of proof (FCC, 2015c).  
In the midst of this complaint DIRECTV was attempting a merger with AT&T for 
$48.5 billion.  The good faith suit may have been more to make a point about such a large 
merger then truly a complaint (Ebersole, 2015).  
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2.4.9. Summary 2011-2015. 
The time period of 2011 to 2015 was an intense and fast-paced few years in the 
world of retransmission consent.  The twenty-year review of the law that began this 
conversation only emphasized divided industry lines along which stood the  broadcasters 
and the MVPD’s.  The limits of the FCC’s power were pushed as they sought to change 
retransmission consent rules and seemingly found new ways to support MVPD’s quest to 
change the existing structure.  Aereo tested a new technology within the existing structure 
and while it may not have been successful in approach, it pushed the limits of what could 
be accomplished and might be sought by consumers.  With blackouts, retransmission 
consent fees and reverse retransmission consent fees all on the rise, we leave 2015 with 
the question of whether the rules will ever be adjusted or simply left as they are?  
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3. Methods 
 The aim of this literature-based research thesis was to understand if 
retransmission consent rules are still needed in the year 2016.  Through the research, a 
timeline of important events related to retransmission consent was considered and the 
following research questions were asked. 
1. Why was retransmission consent needed when implemented in 1992?  
2. What are the variables associated with retransmission consent negotiations?   
3. What effects have technology, profit and consumers had on the field of television 
and the entertainment industry?  
4. Are the costs and blackouts alone affecting the industry and what justification is 
there to maintain or modify the current retransmission consent rules? 
3.1. Setting 
 In an effort to answer the above questions this study was conducted using both a 
quantitative and qualitative approach.  Over the phone and in-person interviews were 
conducted.  Data provided by SNL Kagan was organized and analyzed.  Primarily on-line 
resources such as Drexel University’s library, news wires and communication journals 
were used to guide the focus of background research.  The U.S. Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science & Transportations provided archived webcast videos of the hearings. 
While the FCC’s website provides documents around all proceedings and reports.  The 
research for this paper was completed between January 2015 and June of 2016, with data 
collection ending on December 31, 2015.   
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3.2. Participants 
 The participants involved in this study were chosen out of a convenience sample.  
In an effort to understand a cable prospective and a broadcaster prospective the 
researcher spoke with two members of the communities, off the record. 
• Rose Perez, Senior Vice President, Business & Legal Affairs at Vubiquity. 
Between the years of 1988 to 1995 she was on the General Counsel & Secretary 
at Times Mirror Cable Television.  Ms. Perez also partook in the first rounds of 
retransmission consent negotiations and stays current on the issues to present day. 
• Dennis Wharton, Executive Vice President, Communications, National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB). As an employee of NAB since 1996, Mr. 
Wharton has observed how retransmission consent changed with broadcasters 
over the years.   
3.3. Measurement Instruments 
 The primary source used to provide retransmission consent negotiation 
information, blackout data, and cost figures was SNL Kagan, an offering of S&P Global 
Market Intelligence.  SNL Kagan consider themselves a “single source for in-depth 
analysis and proprietary data on the constantly-evolving media and communications 
business” (Broadcast Industry Analysis, 2016).  Their service is an industry standard and 
the data collection results they provide are widely used.  
 SNL Kagan strives to provide more than just raw data in terms of blackouts and 
costs but also from an analyzed point of view.  They also look into the industry data and 
provide in depth analysis on their collected sums.  They use publicly available 
information such as financials, earnings calls, and projections and trusted sources in the 
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field.  The data they provide as a service has been put through internal validity by testing 
which include the following processes depicted by SNL Kagan (J. Dranginis, personal 
communication, July 19, 2016): 
 
• Validation of operator service areas.   
• Validation of ownership trades (M&A activity).   
• Growth of each metric per provider per DMA. Some providers have higher 
growth for specific metrics than others.  
• Subscriber counts are constrained at a local level based on copyright filings (noted 
above).  
• Subscriber counts are constrained at a national level for both analog and digital 
subscribers for the top 14 operators. 
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4. Results 
The topic of retransmission consent and the resulting standards for and results of 
negotiations continue to be a contested area of federal regulation, technological 
development and industry strategy and evolution.  The line between broadcasters and 
MVPD’s was drawn in the sand and negotiation tactics ultimately drew the consumer into 
the crosshairs of a battle between content providers and distributors.  Over the past few 
years, the FCC has floated proposals on various topics to adjust the current 
retransmission consent laws.  In 2014, the FCC sought comment on eliminating or 
modifying network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules.  Another proposal 
sought comment in 2015 on adjusting the  “totality of circumstance” test.  So far, all the 
proposals outlined below have generated comment from several parties, but the FCC has 
not taken further action on rulemaking.  If any of the rules are to change, there would be 
consequences on both sides of the party line.   
4.1. Network Non-Duplication 
 “This rule protects a local television station’s right to be the exclusive provider of 
network content in its market.  FCC promulgated the rule in 1966 to protect local 
television stations from competition from cable operators that might retransmit the 
signals of stations from distant markets. FCC was concerned that the ability of cable 
operators to import the signals of stations in distant markets into a local market was 
unfair to local television stations with exclusive contractual rights to air network content 
in their local market.  The rule allows exclusivity within the area of geographic protection 
agreed to by the network and the station, so long as that region is within a radius of 35 
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miles – for large markets – or 55 miles – for small markets – from the station)” (GAO, 
2015) 
4.2. Syndication Exclusivity 
 “This rule protects a local television station’s right to be exclusive provider of 
syndicated content in its market.  FCC first promulgated the rule in 1972 to protect local 
television stations and ensure the continued supply of content.  This rule applies within 
an area of geographic protection agreed to by the syndicator and the station, so long as 
that region is within a 35-mile radius from the station” (GAO, 2015) 
4.3. Totality of Circumstance 
 “…we seek comment below on any potential updates we should make to the 
totality of the circumstances test to ensure that the conduct of broadcasters and MVPDs 
during negotiations for retransmission consent and after such negotiations have broken 
down meet the good faith standard in Section 325 of the act.  In Section III.A, we seek 
comment generally on the totality of the circumstances test, including whether and how 
we should identify as evidencing bad faith under the totality of the circumstances test.” 
(FCC, 2015b)  
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5. Discussion  
The focus of this paper was to provide both an evaluation and an analysis of the 
topic of retransmission consent rules as they stand in 2016.  The evolution of 
retransmission consent agreements between broadcast television providers and 
multichannel video programming distributors is marked by a history of conflicting 
interests that only heightens the question as to whether these rules will be needed or 
wanted in the future.  Major themes emerged during the research process, creating a 
triangle of variables or motivators of change: consumers, technology and profit.  The 
changes from the initial onset of broadcast television, the opportunities for new 
technology to make television programming better and more accessible to the consumer 
are only challenged by the competing interest of profitability.  Information collected was 
related to these three variables as it related to the ongoing existence of the FCC rules 
related to the existing retransmission consent construct.   
For clarity of the discussion the three sides of the triangle will be broken down 
per topic: 
Consumers: 
 In the battle over retransmission consent, consumer interest, appetite and 
consumption are important forces driving the production and distribution industries to 
continue negotiations and to be compliant with the good faith requirements of the FCC 
regulations.  When a negotiation is stalled, the fee based on the subscriber count is often 
cited as a leading contention point.  However, from an analysis of the history of 
retransmission consent, it appears as though consumers may simply equate to numbers 
that drive profitability and pressure market-driven adversaries to reach a deal rather than 
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what the FCC intends when it legislates in the “public interest.”    Ironically, today, with 
the multiples of platforms available to the consumer, it would seem that broadcasters and 
MVPD’s should look more closely at the power and interest of the consumer or risk 
gambling over the ever-changing generational habits that may make one platform 
obsolete, because it becomes over-priced or too difficult to access. 
The age gap between the Millennials, Generation X and Baby Boomers provides 
some thought behind the current MVPD customer’s habits. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Percent of the Population Who Pays for Television 
Age Percent population who have cable or satellite service at home 
18-29 65% 
30-49 73% 
50+ 83% 
Note. Adapted from “One-in-seven Americans are television ‘cord cutters’”, by J. B. Horrigan, and M. 
Duggan, 2015, Home Broadband 2015. Copyright 2016 by Pew Research Center. 
 
 
 
While household income certainly plays a role in the affordability of subscribing to an 
MVPD, the willingness of the consumers to pay the monthly fee leans to the 50+ age 
group, which presumably have a larger disposable income.  In turn, the consumer expects 
the user experience to be easy and to receive their local television channels without 
needing to put up an antenna or switch inputs on their television.  75% of younger 
generation without a subscription “say they can access content they want to watch either 
online…or via an over-the air antenna.” (Horrigan & Duggan, 2015) 
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From personal experience, the vital utility for Millennials is the Internet.  With 
that connection they can find whatever programming they desire to watch with no care 
for what physical screen they watch it on.  The OTT content delivery will vary from 
laptop to connected television and even mobile devices.  They will hook up a gaming 
system and multitask while viewing content from providers like HBO, Amazon, or 
Netflix.  At the same time they will still continue to watch over-the-air broadcasts. The 
technical challenges of finding the programming and subscribing to an application for a 
different cost, to a Millennial, is worth the cost savings.  Consumers will either forgive 
blackouts or find away to obtain the content they are missing online.  
Technology: 
 Just like broadcast television was a technological disruption for radio, cable 
television was an early disruptor to broadcasters.  From satellite television, to the 
invention of the Internet, the process of the next technological disruption was beginning 
before the broadcast industry chose to react.  According to Nielsen’s (a leading television 
measurements company), in 2015, broadcast television still had the highest rated 
primetime television programs (Tops of 2015: TV and Social Media, 2015).  As recently 
as June 2016, Nielsen’s released viewership results for several online streaming services.  
One such program was Netflix’s release “Orange is the New Black”, stating that the first 
episode was viewed by 6.7 million people.  That number of viewers “would be 
comparable to the second most-viewed cable drama on TV.” (Sharma, 2016) 
The new technological innovations of computers, iPads and even smart-phones have 
enabled viewers to consume traditional television type programs from alternatives 
sources.  Netflix, Amazon Video and Hulu have disrupted the idea that all television must 
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be viewed on a traditional television set or through a cable or satellite provider.  This has 
put consumers in control of how they watch “TV”.  The new competition in the field of 
programming is directly correlated to the technological changes created by Over-the-Top 
(OTT) content.   
Profit: 
 Profit is unquestionably the highest motivator of change within any for-profit 
industry.  In the television industry, one group of entities is concerned primarily with 
acquiring programming that consumers want to view.  And, another group of entities is 
concerned with monetizing those consumers.   
 Creating programming, to be accessible across all content providers, is an 
expensive and resource-intensive proposition.  One such example is the 2016 summer 
Olympics television rights.  NBC Universal, with parent company Comcast Corporation, 
purchased the rights for $1.23 billion dollars and expected to create over six thousand 
hours of program between 11 television networks and digital platforms (Holloway, 
2016).  While advertising sales could be into the billion’s of dollars, revenues derived 
from the rights cost alone will not make up for the rest of the production cost.  In addition 
to pure calculable profit, the branding and name recognition grown through the event is 
hard to put a dollar figure on.  
A broadcast company can primarily monetize consumers in two ways: advertising 
and retransmission consent.  MVPD’s and OTT providers monetize the consumer with a 
direct income stream from the consumer  with local advertising revenue providing a 
secondary stream of revenue.  
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Throughout this analysis, we have seen  several examples of companies that 
elected to engage in hard bargaining over retransmission consent.  Some companies 
appeared to play harder than the rest. In order to analyze the income from a sample of 
those companies, the below chart was created with information from the 10-k provided to 
the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission.  The line item was Revenue, Operating 
Revenue and Results of operations, also known as the gross income that each company 
measured in 2015 and 2010 for comparison.    
 
 
 
Table 5 
Service Provider Earnings in 2010 and 2015 
Provider $ in 2015 $ in 2010 
Time Warner Inc. 28,118,000 A 26,888,000 B 
Dish 15,068,901C 12,640,744D 
Media General 1,304,943E 678,115F 
Sinclair 2,011,946G 655,378H 
ATime Warner (2015) & BTime Warner (2010).  CDISH Network Corporation (2015) & DDISH Network 
Corporation (2010).  EMedia General (2015) & FMedia General (2010).  GSinclair Broadcast Group (2015) 
& HSinclair Broadcast Group (2010). 
 
 
 
It is the prediction of the author that the prices for retransmission consent will 
continue to grow.  The pace, at which the rate of growth changes, will become steady 
state and grow every three years as negotiations take place.  This creates a growth that 
broadcasters and MVPDs alike can count on and thus all industries can utilize these 
resources to budget accordingly.   
Regulation also affects change  
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The FCC has been asking questions about the need to modify retransmission 
consent rules for many years.  I believe that the market is changing faster then the FCC 
can keep up with comments, and therefore the rules will not change significantly before 
the FCC can secure a grasp of the future of the industry.  What options does the FCC 
have to adjust retransmission consent? What impact would be made if law stayed the 
same, was changed, or was repealed?  
If the law was modified with 2015 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)  
If the retransmission consent law is modified to include distant signals being 
allowed into local markets, I believe the whole power regime will start to change.  I can 
imagine more MVPD’s would drive a hard negotiation line with local broadcasters.  This 
would allow the MVPD to lower a price per consumer or they would simply make 
another deal to take the cheapest signal they can into multiple distant markets.  This shift 
takes the power from each local market broadcaster away and gives it to the MVPD.  
Broadcasters would be forced to take lower prices and potentially struggle with network 
affiliations.  The consumers would loose access to their local programming and again, be 
caught in the middle. 
If this proposal was modified to import distant signals only during a negotiation 
blackout 
What if a distant signal were to be allowed into a local market with the condition 
that it is only during a negotiation blackout?  I believe that the power of the negotiations 
still begins to shift away from Broadcasters and towards MVPD’s.   
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• The cost of retransmission consent agreements would go down, because a 
broadcaster will be forced to negotiate and accept lower rates to avoid a distant 
signal being imported. 
• There will be fewer blackouts because broadcasters will bow to the MVPD to stay 
on in their local market 
• Any blackouts that do happen will be longer because the MVPD will import a 
distant signal and the local broadcaster is standing up for their rights and will not 
bow to a bad deal. 
• Consumers will deal with the blackout longer, because they have access to the 
main network shows from an imported signal or other platform, and they can get 
their local news online. 
• Other consumers will care about missing their local news and the imported single 
from different city.  This situation is the same as a black out to this group of 
consumers. 
• Parent networks adjust their contract with local broadcasters so the signal is not 
allowed to be imported into other markets. 
• Or the opposite and a broadcaster changes their local station to accommodate for 
the new market to keep the added viewership on the MVPD 
From Dennis Wharton at the National Association of Broadcasters.  “When a pay-tv 
provider wishes to carry the most popular content on television, it only makes sense 
that broadcasters should have the ability to fairly negotiate carriage of that 
programming. Providing marquee entertainment and sports programming, in addition 
to critical local news, weather and emergency information, has been a linchpin of 
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local broadcasting since its inception. The FCC has no authority to interfere with free 
market negotiations that provide mutual benefit for all stakeholders.”  (D. Wharton, 
personal communication, May 12, 2016)  
No changes to the current law 
Consumer habits are changing and accepting technology faster then just a few 
years ago.  Watching “TV” over the Internet isn’t so scary or unusual anymore.  With 
Showtime, CBS and Amazon Prime available as stand alone apps, the consumer brain is 
shifting to “I don’t need the big package and can get a smaller make my own bundle.”  
Consumers are willing to cut the cord if the user experience is easy and more conducive 
to the point, click and watch appetite of today’s consumer.  If the retransmission consent 
law is left as it currently stands, I believe that the market will figure out the next profit 
model on it’s own.  Broadcasters will continue to raise prices during negotiations every 
three years, but the rise will eventually even out once the revenue stream reaches it 
maturity and the next stream is discovered.  Networks will continue to raise reverse 
retransmission consent prices.  MVPD’s will continue to raise prices for the end 
consumer or make up for it by raising the price of other offerings.  An MVPD will 
become creative in their offerings and create a skinny package with no broadcast content 
as a test to see if the market will pay for the extra content that they have to offer.  
College-age students will not pay the cost for a larger package.  The industry knows this 
now. Customers will begin to pay more for Internet subscriptions and other platforms that 
provide for more choice at a lower cost, and the industry seems to be already preparing to 
adjust to this appetite.  
The law could be repealed 
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 MVPD’s would like this option the best, but in all practicality this is not an 
option, as it would undo many founding principals of creating a television marketplace.  
So in the end how do I feel about it… 
The cable industry has been trying to undo the retransmission consent rules since 
they were passed in 1992.  Now, the current proposals, especially importing distant 
signal, is aimed at taking power away from the broadcast industry and giving it to the 
MVPD's. What broadcaster would allow their signal to be imported into a distant market? 
Would their network affiliation even allow this?  If a smaller broadcaster, who didn't 
have the negotiation support created a bad deal with an MVPD, their signal would 
potential be available for sending to multiple locations?  In this case, isn't it true that the 
MVPD has all the power placing unfair pressure on the little guy and utilizing theme to 
protect their money?  This doesn't help the consumer in any way.   
Will a distant signal being imported bring down the monthly customer bill?  The 
cable industry might say that this helps to even out the economic playing field.  If their 
are no blackouts, prices will go down because local broadcaster won't want their signal 
replaced with a distant signal and the cost will lower.  What does that do to the industry 
as a whole?  Now, broadcasters don't have the income for higher quality 
programming?  Who will air sports and primetime productions?  Broadcasters will now 
face more intense competition from OTT distribution and cable broadcasters for the 
programing content.  Does that help the industry? While it may appear on the face of it to 
even the playing ground, I feel it separates the haves from the have not’s.  If a household 
doesn't have money to purchase cable or the Internet and broadcasting suffers, all those 
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households lose local programming.  Why should pay services take advantage of 
customers put into that situation? 
Shouldn’t the broadcaster that invests money and resources in creating and 
producing quality programming be able to receive value from those who profit from its 
distribution in addition to the sale of advertising? Technology has changed the film and 
video industry dramatically to include many different forms of new competitors, forcing 
business models to adjust after a long period of stability with limited disruptive 
innovation.  This new technology has created new consumers and market forces are 
pushing the industries to adapt to new directions.   
I can conclude from my analysis that retransmission consent negotiations, as a 
whole, will not simply “go away” for two primary reasons.  First, copyright laws are 
written to protect the owner of original content.  One of the central ideas behind the 
ownership of copyright in intellectual property is to allow the owner to profit from that 
ownership. Allowing a business entity to profit exclusively from the distribution of 
another’s intellectual property simply because they have found a way to distribute that 
property runs afoul of our basic understanding of intellectual property and ownership of 
content.  High-level sports and other high quality productions have limited numbers of 
buyers with the capital and the viewership to compete for content ownership.  While 
these prices may appear to be over-inflated, the partnership between the content owners 
and distributors has long been the symbiotic, albeit not always happy, relationship that 
has been the foundation of the television industry from day one.  Artificially shifting 
power from one segment of the industry to another would seem to undermine that 
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relationship and upset the balance of motivational factors of profit, technology and 
consumerism that have allowed the industry to survive and in fact grow for years. 
Second, the revenue stream provided by the retransmission consent agreements 
has now become significantly ingrained into the broadcaster’s business model.  This 
revenue line will not be surrendered easily by the broadcasters.  Currently, consumers are 
not willing to pay a monthly bill for a MVPD offering in which they do not include the 
broadcast channels, so broadcasters are going to take advantage of the upper hand 
pressure of inclusion while they can.  
The evaluation of what television has become over time is an amazing look at an 
industry changing business models one hundred and eighty degrees.  Over the course of 
its history no other industry, so integrated with all of the population, has reversed its 
income revenue streams as successfully as broadcasters.  MVPDs, broadcasters and OTT 
television are all continuing to evolve as consumers, technology and profit continue to 
push the industries forward. 
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